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Abstract
The Traveler’s Dilemma game and the Minimum Effort Coordination game are two social dilemmas that have attracted
considerable attention due to the fact that the predictions of classical game theory are at odds with the results found when
the games are studied experimentally. Moreover, a direct application of deterministic evolutionary game theory, as
embodied in the replicator dynamics, to these games does not explain the observed behavior. In this work, we formulate
natural variants of these two games as smoothed continuous-strategy games. We study the evolutionary dynamics of these
continuous-strategy games, both analytically and through agent-based simulations, and show that the behavior predicted
theoretically is in accord with that observed experimentally. Thus, these variants of the Traveler’s Dilemma and the
Minimum Effort Coordination games provide a simple resolution of the paradoxical behavior associated with the original
games.
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Introduction
Social dilemmas embody the tension between individual self-
interest and the common good that is inherent in many important
situations in the real world. In a social dilemma, individually
reasonable behavior results in a situation in which all individuals
are less well off than they could otherwise have been [1]. Social
dilemmas underlie many of the most fundamental and intractable
problems in the biological and social sciences, such as the
evolution of cooperation [2] and the efficient use of limited shared
resources [3]. From a more formal point of view, a social dilemma
can be modeled as a game in which there exists at least one Hicks
inefficient Nash equilibrium. It is Hicks inefficient (i.e. socially
inefficient) in that there is at least one other outcome in which all
individuals would be better off, and since it is a Nash equilibrium
there is no incentive for any individual to change their behavior
[1]. Examples of 2-person games that are social dilemmas include:
The Prisoner’s Dilemma [2,4,5], the Snowdrift game (also known
as the Chicken or Hawk-Dove game) [6], and the Stag-Hunt game
(also known as the Assurance game) [7]. Multi-person social
dilemmas include, the Public Goods game [8,9] and the Tragedy
of the Commons [3]. While the original game theory formaliza-
tions of these social dilemmas typically involved discrete-strategy
games, more recently continuous-strategy versions of the Prison-
er’s Dilemma game [10], the Snowdrift game [11], the Tragedy of
the Commons [12] game, and the Public Goods game [13] have
been formulated and studied.
One particularly fascinating class of social dilemmas are those
for which the predictions of game theory appear to be inconsistent
with the behavior observed when the games are played
experimentally [14]. The Traveler’s Dilemma (TD) game [15–
17] and the Minimum Effort Coordination (MEC) game [17,18]
are two celebrated examples of such games.
These games challenge the notion that the rational solution to a
game, as embodied in the concept of the Nash equilibrium,
accurately describes the behavior of humans engaged in these
social dilemmas. In the TD game there exists a unique, pure
strategy, Nash equilibrium that is undesirable for all concerned. In
contrast to the TD game, in the MEC game every pure strategy is
a Nash equilibrium, and thus the rational solution concept lacks
any prescriptive or predictive power.
The TD game is conventionally introduced through a story of
the following form. Two travelers, on their return journey from an
exotic country, find that their luggage containing identical
souvenirs has been lost by the airline. The officer in the claims
department puts them in separate rooms, hands each of them a
claims form, and tells them that they can claim any integer amount
between R and M (R and M are assumed to be positive integers
with MwR). He also informs them that if they both ask for the
same amount, they will be paid that amount, and if they ask for
different amounts, each will be reimbursed at the lower value, but
with a penalty R deducted from the higher claimant (who is
assumed to have lied) and given to the lower claimant (as a reward
for being honest). Thus, the TD game is a 2-person game with the
discrete strategy set S~fR,Rz1,Rz2, . . . ,Mg, and payoff to an
i-claimant against a j-claimant is defined by
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izR if iv j
i if i~ j
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ð1Þ
In this context a Nash equilibrium is a pair of claims, such that,
if each claim is known to the other traveler then neither has reason
to revise their claim. For Rw1, there is an incentive for each
traveler to undercut any common claim. Using backward
induction, it is not hard to see that the travelers should each
claim the amount R, i.e., (R,R) is a unique Nash equilibrium for
the TD game. Thus, the unique Nash equilibrium of the TD game
is the paradoxical outcome in which both travelers claim the
lowest possible amount. We note, in particular, that the Nash
equilibrium is independent of the reward/punishment parameter
R. However, as intuition would suggest, this is not how individuals
actually play this game [17,19–22]. For instance, [22] found the
following results when they played the game with 50 subjects (25
pairs). The subjects could make claims between 180 and 300, in
two treatments, one with R~180 and another with R~5. The
results are shown in Figure 1(a). In the high-R treatment, close to
80 percent of all the subjects chose the Nash equilibrium strategy,
with an average claim of 201. However, in the low-R treatment,
roughly the same fraction chose the highest possible claim, with an
average value of 280. Since the unique Nash equilibrium
prediction is independent of the parameter R, classical game
theory is unable to explain the most salient feature of these
experimental results, namely, the effect of the reward/punishment
parameter R on average claim levels.
The MEC game has a somewhat similar flavor to the TD game,
in that the payoffs are again determined by the minimum of two
actions [17,18,20]. In this game the players choose integer effort
levels between 1 and M (where M is assumed to be an integer
greater than 1), and a player’s payoff is given by the minimum of
the two effort levels minus the cost of the player’s own effort.
Therefore, the MEC game is a 2-person game with the discrete
strategy set S~f1,2, . . . ,Mg, and payoff to an i-strategist against
a j-strategist defined by
P(i,j)~min (i,j){c:i, ð2Þ
where cv1 is a cost parameter. The MEC game suffers from the
opposite problem to that of the TD game. Instead of exhibiting a
single, deficient, Nash equilibrium, the MEC game exhibits
multiple Nash equilibria; it is easy to see that any common effort
level is a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, standard refinements of the
Nash equilibrium concept do not select a subset of the equilibria.
For instance, the Nash equilibria are strict, and thus trembling
hand-perfect. Hence, classical game theory provides no obvious
criterion to choose among them.
As with the TD game, when the MEC game is actually played
with human subjects the observed behavior is inconsistent with the
results predicted by game theory [17,18]. For example, [17] found
the following results in their experiment. The subjects could chose
integer effort levels from 110 to 170, in one of two treatments, a
low effort cost treatment of c~0:1 and a high effort cost treatment
of c~0:9. The results are shown in Figure 1(b). In the low effort
cost treatment the behavior is concentrated close to the highest
effort level of 170, while in the high effort cost treatment the
preponderance of the effort levels are at the lowest possible value.
These results clearly indicate that the effort levels employed by
subjects are inversely related to the effort costs, despite the fact that
any common effort level is a Nash equilibrium.
The paradoxical results obtained for the TD and MEC games
using classical game theory are not resolved by instead using
standard deterministic evolutionary game theory. Since the unique
Nash equilibrium (R,R) in the TD game is strict it is a globally
stable equilibrium point for the replicator dynamics [23]. Hence,
the replicator dynamics of the TD game will always converge to
the minimum claim level R. Similarly, in the MEC game every
common effort level is a strict Nash equilibrium and hence a stable
equilibrium point for the replicator equations. Thus, the behavior
of the replicator dynamics does not select any subset of the Nash
equilibria. The paradoxical nature of both games is, therefore,
equally evident when studied using either classical game theory or
deterministic evolutionary game theory.
It is noteworthy that the importance of the TD game and the
MEC game are rather similar in nature. The TD game is
theoretically significant because it exposes so clearly an apparently
paradoxical aspect of game theory: namely the inability of the
Nash equilibrium concept to predict the actual behavior of
individuals interacting in this type of game. Moreover, it has been
observed in [24] that the TD models competitive egg ejection in a
Figure 1. Results from playing the TD and MEC games with human subjects, adapted from [17]. (a) TD game: individuals make higher
claims when the reward/punishment parameter R is low, and make lower claims when R is high. (b) MEC game: individuals expend more effort when
the effort cost c is low, and less effort when c is high.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0093988.g001
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species of communally nesting birds, the Greater Ani [25,26]. In
this species, if two females share a nest then each female chooses a
time to change from ejecting eggs from the nest to laying eggs. If
both select an early time (which corresponds to a large claim), then
both obtain a large payoff since they can both successfully lay
many eggs. If, however, one chooses to wait, then she can eject the
other birds already-laid eggs and obtain an even greater payoff,
while at the same time inflicting a loss on the other bird [24].
Thus, this situation has the structure of the TD game.
The MEC game also has both theoretical and practical
importance. It is theoretically significant because it starkly
illustrates the lack of prescriptive or predictive power inherent in
the notion of Nash equilibrium. In addition, it has considerable
practical import since many interesting and important real-world
situations can be modeled by MEC games [27].
As an example of how MEC games naturally arise let us
consider two companies, denoted by A and B, each of which
manufacture a critical component of a jointly produced product.
Let us suppose that company A makes widgets, while company B
makes grommets. The final product, containing both a widget and
a grommet, is sold jointly, with the revenues being equally split
between the two companies. Each company can choose the
amount of effort to expend in producing its component, with
higher effort levels resulting in components of higher quality. We
shall assume that the performance of the final product, and thus
also the revenues obtained from sales of the product, is limited by
whichever of the two components has the lower quality.
Therefore, the profits obtained by a given company from sales
of the product may be expressed as the minimum of the efforts
expended by each company to produce widgets or grommets,
respectively, minus the cost associated with the companies’ own
effort. Thus, such a situation can be modeled by a MEC game.
The importance of the TD and MEC games, both theoretically
and in practice, is clear from the above comments. Therefore,
obtaining a satisfactory understanding of the dynamics of these
games is of considerable significance, and it is the purpose of this
paper to contribute to such an understanding.
A number of different theoretical approaches have been
investigated as possible explanations of the behavior found
empirically in the TD and MEC games. In one approach,
stochastic learning models [17,20,28] have been proposed to
explain the anomalous behavior observed in the TD and MEC
games. A quite different approach, using stochastic evolutionary
dynamics in finite populations [24], has also been investigated as a
means of resolving the paradoxical features of the TD game.
Other theoretical approaches to explaining the behavior of the TD
game have been studied in [29–32]. Other approaches which
explore how errors in a game may lead to deviations from Nash
equilibrium play include [33–37].
Here we propose an alternative, considerably simpler, theoret-
ical framework to explain the evolutionary dynamics of both the
TD and MEC games, which accounts for the empirically observed
behavior. Our method applies to a wide class of games that
includes both the TD and MEC games. We first observe that while
the TD and MEC games were originally formulated as discrete
strategy games it is natural to consider variants of these games in
which the strategies are continuously variable. In this paper we
define these continuous-strategy variants of the TD and MEC
games, which suffer from the same paradoxical behavior as the
original discrete-strategy games, and it is these continuous-strategy
games that form the starting point for our approach to
understanding the evolutionary dynamics of the TD and MEC
games.
The continuous-strategy forms of the TD and MEC games are
two examples of a large class of continuous-strategy games which
have a discontinuous payoff function — other important examples
of games from this class include the Bertrand Duopoly game [38]
and the War of Attrition game [6]. For such games the role played
by errors is potentially important. To be precise, let us consider the
class of continuous-strategy games with payoff function given by
P(x,y)~
w(x,y) if xvy
1
2
½w(x,y)zy(x,y) if x~y
y(x,y) if xwy,
ð3Þ
where w(x,y) and y(x,y) are affine functions, and the strategies
x,y[Rz. This class of games includes the continuous-strategy
variants of both the TD and MEC games. Errors in the
observation of an opponents strategy or in the implementation
of ones own strategy will result in the expected payoff to an x-
strategist against a y-strategist in such a game being given by a
function of the form
P(x,y)~w(x,y)h(y{x)zy(x,y)h(x{y), ð4Þ
where h(y{x) defines the probability that in an interaction
between an x-strategist and a y-strategist errors lead to the x-
strategist receiving the payoff w(x,y), and h(x{y) defines the
probability that in such an interaction errors result in the x-
strategist receiving the payoff y(x,y). We observe that the
probability functions h(x{y) and h(y{x) are necessarily
complementary in the sense that h(x{y)zh(y{x)~1, from
which it follows that h(0)~
1
2
. The probability functions h(x{y)
and h(y{x) are determined by the statistical distribution of errors
in the game. Here, for simplicity, we shall assume that the function
h is smooth. Thus, the expected payoff (4) defines a smoothing of the
original discontinuous payoff function (3). We shall often refer to
the function h as the smoothing function. In the limit in which the
smoothing function tends to the Heaviside step function the
expected payoff (4) approaches the payoff (3).
Since the purpose of this paper is to study the evolutionary
behavior of the TD and MEC games it is necessary to define a
suitable evolutionary dynamics for the class of games that we are
considering. Since the effect of errors in the game is to give an
expected payoff which is a smooth function, the simplest choice of
dynamics is the standard deterministic adaptive dynamics [39–41]
of the smoothed payoff function. In our approach the effects of
errors in the game is encoded in the smoothing function h. Here
we study the evolutionary dynamics of the smoothed versions of
the TD and MEC game, for an arbitrary smoothing function, and
show that the results obtained are consistent with those found
empirically.
The approach to studying the evolutionary dynamics of the TD
and MEC games that we follow in this paper has some advantages
compared to stochastic learning models [17,20,28] or stochastic
evolutionary dynamics [24]. In the case of stochastic learning
models, the evolutionary dynamics is governed by the Fokker-
Planck equation, which is a nonlinear partial differential equation
that cannot be solved analytically [17, 20, 28]. The equilibrium
solutions of the evolutionary dynamics are given by the solutions to
a suitable differential equation. However, it is difficult to
determine analytically whether or not the equilibrium solutions
are stable. In fact, the equilibrium solutions to the stochastic
learning models [17,20,28] for both the TD and MEC games have
The Traveler’s Dilemma and Minimum Effort Coordination Game
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 April 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 4 | e93988

not been shown to be stable, and thus, it is unclear whether or not
they are attractors of the evolutionary dynamics.
Stochastic evolutionary dynamics [24] represents an interesting
alternative approach to understanding the dynamics of many
evolutionary processes. In this case, the evolutionary dynamics is
governed by a stochastic process, and the theory is mathematically
well-developed. However, there are certain restrictions that apply
to the theory. Perhaps the most important is that analytic results
can only be obtained in the limit that the selection strength tends
to zero. This limit corresponds to the assumption that the
contribution to the total payoff that comes from the game
interactions is very small. It is not clear that this assumption is
realistic when it comes to understanding the behavior of the TD
and MEC games. If the assumption of weak selection is not made
then it is impossible to obtain analytic results, although numerical
simulations can yield results for stronger selection strengths. It is
also worth noting that while the stochastic process underlying
stochastic evolutionary dynamics is mathematically well-devel-
oped, it is rather subtle, and this can present a challenge when
applying the method to new problems. In fact, stochastic
evolutionary dynamics has not yet been applied to study the
MEC game, although we conjecture that such an application will
yield results consistent with the behavior observed in the game.
A key advantage of the method that we propose here is that the
evolutionary dynamics is much easier to study than for either
stochastic learning models [17,20,28] or stochastic evolutionary
dynamics [24]. In particular, it is straightforward to completely
determine the evolutionary attractors for both the TD and MEC
games. A second advantage of our method is that it applies directly
to a wide variety of continuous-strategy games with discontinuous
payoff functions, including the Bertrand Duopoly model [38] and
the War of Attrition game [6]. In certain cases, which are
considered at greater length in the Discussion, it can be shown
using our methods that complex evolutionary dynamics, such as
evolutionary branching, can occur in such games.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the Models
section, we define continuous-strategy versions of the TD and
MEC games, and also introduce the key notion of smoothed
versions of these games. In the Analysis section, we analyze the
evolution of strategies in the smoothed games in randomly-
interacting populations using adaptive dynamics, and in addition
formulate an agent-based model of the evolutionary dynamics of
these games in populations with structures described by an
arbitrary graph (i.e., network). In the Results section, we present
the results of simulations using this agent-based model for the
evolutionary dynamics of the smoothed TD and MEC games,
both in well-mixed populations and in populations described by
complex networks. Finally, in Discussion section, we provide a
brief discussion of our work and draw some conclusions.
Models
The strategies in the TD and the MEC games are the claim
levels and the effort levels, respectively. Typically these games are
taken to have a discrete set of strategies. However, it is in many
ways more natural to view the claim levels and effort levels in the
two games as being continuously variable, and thus to consider
variants of these games defined for continuous strategies. The
continuous forms of the TD and MEC games are examples of a
broad class of continuous-strategy 2-person games with payoff
functions given by
P(x,y)~
w(x,y) if xvy
1
2
½w(x,y)zy(x,y) if x~y
y(x,y) if xwy,
ð5Þ
for affine functions w(x,y) and y(x,y), and strategies x,y[Rz. We
may write P(x,y) more succinctly with the aid of the Heaviside
step function H(u)
H(u)~
0 if uv0
1
2
if u~0
1 if uw0,
ð6Þ
as
P(x,y)~w(x,y)H(y{x)zy(x,y)H(x{y): ð7Þ
Games of this form have discontinuous payoff functions. Such a
discontinuous payoff function is only possible in an idealized world
free from all errors. In reality, errors in the perception and
implementation of actions in the game will have the effect of
replacing the discontinuous payoff function with a smoothed
approximation, representing the expected payoff. We now define
such a variant of the game in which the discontinuity in the payoff
function is removed by a smoothing procedure. To accomplish this
we introduce a 1-parameter family of smoothing functions hk(u).
The functions hk(u) are assumed to be smooth, non-decreasing
functions of u, with limu?z? hk(u)~1, limu?{? hk(u)~0, and
hk(0)~
1
2
. Furthermore, we assume that hk(u)?H(u) as k??.
We will refer to the parameter k as the smoothing parameter.
To obtain the smoothed version of the game defined by (7) we
simply replace H(u) in the payoff function with its smooth
approximation hk(u). Thus, the payoff function of the smoothed
game is given by
Pk(x,y)~w(x,y)hk(y{x)zy(x,y)hk(x{y): ð8Þ
We note that for sufficiently large values of k the smoothed
game approximates the original game arbitrarily well.
A convenient 1-parameter family of smoothing functions is
given by
hk(x)~
1
1ze{kx
, ð9Þ
and we shall use this family when explicit smoothing functions are
required.
Traveler’s Dilemma Game
The claims made by individuals in the TD game represent their
strategies. If x and y denote the strategies used by two individuals
playing the continuous version of the game, and if R denotes the
reward/punishment parameter (where x,y,R[Rz), then the payoff
to the x-strategist is given by
P(x,y)~(xzR)H(y{x)z(y{R)H(x{y): ð10Þ
We now define a variant of the TD game defined by (10), in
which the discontinuity in the payoff function is removed by the
The Traveler’s Dilemma and Minimum Effort Coordination Game
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smoothing procedure described above. To obtain the smoothed
TD game we simply replace H(x) in the payoff function with its
smooth approximation hk(x). We therefore have that the payoff
function for the smoothed TD game is given by
Pk(x,y)~(xzR)hk(y{x)z(y{R)hk(x{y): ð11Þ
We shall assume, without loss of generality, that the strategy
space in the smoothed TD game is the interval ½0,1, and also that
the reward/punishment parameter R[(0,1). With the payoff
function defined by (11), the smoothed TD game represents a
natural variant of the original TD game.
Minimum Effort Coordination Game
In the MEC game, the effort levels of the individuals represent
their strategies. In the continuous version of the MEC game, if the
strategies of two individuals playing the game are x and y (where
x,y[Rz) and c [(0,1) is the effort cost, then the payoff P(x,y) to
the x-strategist is given by
P(x,y)~min (x,y){c:x: ð12Þ
Using (12) allows us to write the payoff function for the MEC
game as
P(x,y)~(x{cx)H(y{x)z(y{cx)H(x{y): ð13Þ
Without loss of generality we can take the strategy space to be
the unit interval (i.e. x,y[½0,1). Every strategy pair (x,x) is a Nash
equilibrium in this game. The social dilemma embodied in this
continuous-strategy game is clearly the same as for the original
discrete MEC game: at any equilibrium both players obtain a
payoff of (1{c)x, thus all equilibria with the sole exception of the
strategy pair (1,1) are Hicks inefficient.
To obtain the smoothed MEC game we again replace H(x) in
the payoff function (13) with its smooth approximation hk(x). The
payoff function of the smoothed MEC game is therefore given by
Pk(x,y)~(x{cx)hk(y{x)z(y{cx)hk(x{y): ð14Þ
With the payoff function defined by (14), the smoothed MEC
game represents a natural variant of the original MEC game.
Analysis
The dynamics of the smoothed TD and MEC games as
formulated in the previous section can be analyzed in a well-mixed
population using the deterministic framework of adaptive dynam-
ics [11,39–41]. Consider a monomorphic population in which
every individual adopts the same strategy, x. It follows from
replicator dynamics that the growth rate of a rare mutant strategy,
y, in the resident x population is fx(y)~Pk(y,x){Pk(x,x), where
Pk(x,y) is the payoff to an x-strategist interacting with a y-
strategist. The quantity fx(y) is referred to as the invasion fitness.
The evolution of the strategy x is then governed by the selection
gradient D(x)~
Lfx
Ly
jy~x, and the adaptive dynamics of x is
determined by the differential equation _x~D(x).
Equilibrium points of the adaptive dynamics are called singular
strategies and are solutions of D(x?)~0. If no such solutions exist,
then the strategy x monotonically increases or decreases under
evolution, depending on the sign of D(x). If x? exists, it is
convergent stable and, hence an attractor for the adaptive
dynamics, if
dD
dx
jx~x?v0. If this equality is reversed, x? is a
repeller.
Initially, the population will converge to a convergent stable
singular point x?, but its subsequent evolutionary fate depends on
whether x? is a maximum or minimum of the invasion fitness
fx(y). If x
? is a maximum, i.e., if
L2fx
Ly2
jy~x?v0, then x? is an
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), representing an evolutionary
end state in which all individuals adopt strategy x?. If, however,
L2fx
Ly2
jy~x?w0, then a population of x?-strategists can be invaded
by mutant strategies on either side of x?. In this case the
population undergoes evolutionary branching and splits into two
distinct and diverging clusters of strategies.
The adaptive dynamics of smoothed games with payoff function
defined by (8) may be analyzed as follows. The invasion fitness is
given by
fx(y)~Pk(y,x){Pk(x,x)
~w(y,x)hk(x{y)zy(y,x)hk(y{x){½w(x,x)zy(x,x)hk(0):
ð15Þ
Thus, the selection gradient D(x) is given by
D(x)~
Lfx(y)
Ly
jy~x
~
L
Ly
½w(y,x)hk(x{y)zy(y,x)hk(y{x){w(x,x)hk(0)
{y(x,x)hk(0)jy~x
~½y(x,x){w(x,x)h0k(0)zhk(0)
L
Ly
½w(y,x)zy(y,x)jy~x
~½y(x,x){w(x,x)h0k(0)z
1
2
L
Ly
½w(y,x)zy(y,x)jy~x:
ð16Þ
The adaptive dynamics of such a game is therefore determined
by the differential equation
_x~½y(x,x){w(x,x)h0k(0)z
1
2
L
Ly
½w(y,x)zy(y,x)jy~x: ð17Þ
The existence of singular strategies x? in games of this form,
and the particular characteristics of any such x?, depend on fx(y)
and D(x), and thus ultimately on the specific functions w(x,y) and
y(x,y). We shall now apply these results to the TD and MEC
games.
Adaptive Dynamics of the Traveler’s Dilemma Game
Let us first analyze the TD game with the payoff function given
by (11). Consider a monomorphic population of x strategists, i.e., a
population in which every individual claims amount x. It follows
from (2) and (11) that for the TD game w(x,y)~xzR and
y(x,y)~y{R. Thus, the selection gradient D(x) is given by
D(x)~
1
2
{2Rh0(0), ð18Þ
and the adaptive dynamics of x is consequently determined by
The Traveler’s Dilemma and Minimum Effort Coordination Game
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_x~
1
2
{2Rh0(0): ð19Þ
Since D(x) does not depend on x, there are no singular
strategies, and thus there is no possibility of exotic evolutionary
outcomes, such as evolutionary branching. The evolutionary
dynamics of an initial strategy x is determined by the sign of D(x).
If D(x)v0 (i.e., if Rw 1
4h0k(0)
), then x will evolve to 0. If on the
other hand, D(x)w0 (i.e., Rv 1
4h0k(0)
) then x will evolve to 1.
Thus, this adaptive dynamics analysis implies that the players of
the smoothed TD game will evolve to make low claims if
Rw 1
4h0k(0)
, and, conversely, evolve to make high claims if
Rv 1
4h0k(0)
. We note that for the 1-parameter family of smoothing
functions defined by (9), this criterion takes the following form:
claims will evolve to low levels if Rw 1
k
, and evolve to high levels if
Rv 1
k
.
Adaptive Dynamics of the Minimum Effort Coordination
Game
We next turn to the MEC game where the payoff function is
given by (14). Consider a monomorphic population of x strategists,
i.e., a population in which every individual puts in x amount of
effort. It follows from (2) and (13) that for the MEC game
w(x,y)~x{cx and y(x,y)~y{cx. Thus, the selection gradient
D(x) is given by
D(x)~
1
2
{c, ð20Þ
and the adaptive dynamics of x is therefore determined by
_x~
1
2
{c: ð21Þ
Again, since D(x) does not depend on x, there are no singular
strategies. Also, rather remarkably, the adaptive dynamics of x is
independent of the smoothing function hk. The evolution of an
initial strategy x is once again determined by the sign of D(x). If
D(x)v0 (i.e., if cw 1
2
) then x will evolve to 0, and if D(x)w0 (i.e.,
if cv 1
2
) then x will evolve to 1. Therefore, this adaptive dynamics
analysis implies that the players’ strategies in the smoothed MEC
game will evolve to low efforts if the effort cost c is greater than
1
2
,
and to high efforts if cv 1
2
. Since the adaptive dynamics of the
smoothed MEC game is independent of the smoothing function,
these results hold for any smoothing of the game.
We note that the behavior predicted by adaptive dynamics for
the smoothed TD and MEC games is in accord with that observed
for the TD and MEC games in experiments.
Agent-Based Simulations
In this section, we define a stochastic agent-based model which
allows the evolutionary dynamics of the TD and MEC games to be
studied both for random interactions between members of the
population and for more complex interaction patterns in the
population. The evolutionary dynamics of simple social dilemmas,
such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Snowdrift game, have
been well-studied for populations with a variety of complex
interaction patterns [42–50].
Consider a population consisting of n individuals, labeled
i~1,    ,n. Since we wish to allow the possibility of complex
population structures, we identify the population with the set of
vertices in a graph C. The structure of C determines which
individuals in the population can interact. Strictly speaking, two
graphs are required to specify the evolutionary dynamics: an
interaction graph, CI , specifies that two individuals in the
population can interact by playing the game only if they are
adjacent in CI , and an updating graph, CU , specifies that an
individual in the population can update its strategy by comparing
its state to the states only of those individuals adjacent to it in CU .
Here, for simplicity, we shall assume that the interaction and
updating graphs are the same i.e., CI~CU~C. Given an
individual i[C, the set of neighbors of i (i.e., the set of individuals
adjacent to i in C) will be denoted by N(i).
The agent-based model is defined as a stochastic process on C.
Let us fix either the TD or the MEC game as the game under
consideration. We begin with a monomorphic population, i.e.,
each individual in the population starts out with the same initial
strategy randomly picked from a uniform distribution. At each
time step t, we carry out a round of asynchronous interactions
followed by a round of asynchronous updates. Each of these
rounds involves sampling the population with replacement.
During an interaction step, we randomly pick an individual i[C
and an individual j[N(i), and let the two individuals play the game
against each other. If x and y denote the strategies of i and j,
respectively, then the payoff Pi received by the focal individual i is
given by either equation (11) or (14), depending on the game under
consideration. This procedure is repeated n times.
During an update step, we randomly pick an individual i[C and
an individual j[N(i). If Pi and Pj denote the payoffs of i and j,
respectively, then with probability pi/j given by
pi/j~
1
1ze{b(Pj{Pi )
, ð22Þ
the focal individual i will inherit j’s strategy. This update rule is
often referred to as the Fermi rule. The parameter bw0 is the
‘‘selection strength’’ of the update rule. The update procedure is
repeated n times.
Mutations are incorporated in the update procedure in the
following way: when according to the update rule (22) i’s strategy
would be replaced by j’s, then with probability m, i’s strategy is
instead replaced by a strategy picked randomly from a normal
distribution with mean equal to j’s strategy and standard deviation
s. Carrying out n interaction steps followed by n update steps
constitutes a single generation of the evolutionary dynamics.
We note here that the results of our agent-based simulations
(described in detail in the next section) are robust to variations in
the update rule. For example, in addition to employing the Fermi
update rule (22), we have also simulated the agent-based model
using the replicator update rule, in which the probability pi/j that
the focal individual i[C inherits individual j’s strategy (with j[N(i))
is given by
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pi/j~
0 if Pi§Pj
b(Pj{Pi)
M{m
otherwise,
ð23Þ
where M~max
k[C
Pk, and m~min
k[C
Pk. We find that the evolu-
tionary dynamics of the smoothed TD and MEC games is the
same irrespective of which of these update rules we employ. The
results presented in the next section on the evolutionary dynamics
of the TD and MEC games arise from simulations using the Fermi
update rule (22).
Results
In this section we present the results of agent-based simulations
for the TD and MEC games. For both the smoothed TD and
MEC games the agent-based model described in the previous
section was simulated (using the Fermi update rule (22) and the
smoothing function (9)) on the following graphs (see, for example,
[51–54].): a complete graph (which models a randomly-interacting
population); a random regular graph of degree 10; a scale-free
graph with mean degree 10; and two-dimensional lattice graphs
with 4 and 8 neighbors, respectively, and periodic boundary
conditions. The games were simulated for 20000 generations. The
parameter values used for the simulations were: population size,
n~1024 for the lattice graphs and n~1000 for the other graphs;
mutation rate, m~0:05; standard deviation for mutations,
s~0:005; smoothing parameter, k~1:5,2,3 for the TD game
and k~0:5,1,2 for the MEC game; and selection strength, b~5.
Traveler’s Dilemma Game
Figure 2 shows the variation of the average claims x made by
individuals over the last 20% of 20000 generations with the
reward/punishment parameter R, for different values of the
smoothing parameter k, on the following graphs: (a) a complete
graph, (c) a random regular graph, (d) a scale-free graph, (e) a 2D
lattice graph with 4 neighbors, and (f) a 2D lattice graph with 8
neighbors. The R value was varied from 0 to 1 in steps of 0:05,
and each data point was obtained from an average of 10 runs of
the model. It is apparent from these results that, for each value of
k, the claims are high when Rv 1
k
and low when Rw 1
k
, exactly as
predicted by the adaptive dynamics analysis. This behavior is in
good qualitative agreement with the results obtained for the TD
game in experiments. Furthermore, these simulation results
suggest that network structure has very little effect on the
evolutionary dynamics of the game.
Figure 2(b) shows the variation in the number of individuals
with the claims x they make, when R~0:15 and R~0:85, on a
complete graph, with k~2. Individuals make higher claims when
R~0:15, as indicated by the blue bars, and make lower claims
when R~0:85, as indicated by the green bars. This result is in
good agreement with the empirical results shown in Figure 1(a).
We have also simulated the game using the discontinuous form
of the payoff function (10), and the results are shown in blue
(labeled k~?) in panels (a), (c), (d), (e), and (f) of Figure 2. In this
case, the claims are consistently low for all values of R. This result,
which is consistent with the prediction of the adaptive dynamics
analysis of the smoothed TD game in the limit k??, is in
agreement with the prediction of classical game theory for the
original TD game. Thus, for the TD game studied here, the
smoothing of the payoff function is necessary to explain the
empirically observed behavior.
Minimum Effort Coordination Game
Figure 3 shows the variation of the average effort levels x of the
individuals over the last 20% of 20000 generations with the effort
cost parameter c, for various values of the smoothing parameter k,
on the following graphs: (a) a complete graph, (c) a random regular
graph, (d) a scale-free graph, (e) a 2D lattice graph with 4
neighbors, and (f) a 2D lattice graph with 8 neighbors. The c value
was varied from 0 to 1 in steps of 0:05, and each data point was
obtained from an average over 10 runs of the model. It is clear
from these results that, for each value of c, the effort levels are high
when cv 1
2
and low when cw 1
2
, exactly as suggested by the
adaptive dynamics analysis. These results are in good qualitative
agreement with the empirically observed behavior in experiments.
The results of these agent-based simulations clearly show the
independence of the evolutionary dynamics of the smoothed MEC
game on the smoothing function (i.e., the independence on k),
which is predicted by the adaptive dynamics analysis. These results
also suggest that the effect of network structure on the dynamics of
the smoothed MEC game is negligible.
Figure 3(b) shows the variation in the number of individuals
with their effort levels x, when c~0:15 and c~0:85, on a
complete network, with k~2. Individuals expend more effort
when c~0:15, as indicated by the blue bars, and expend lower
effort when c~0:85, as indicated by the green bars. This result is
in good agreement with the empirical results shown in Figure 1(b).
We also simulated the model using the discontinuous form of
the payoff function (13), and the result is shown in blue (k~?) in
plots (a), (c), (d), (e), and (f) of Figure 3. In this case, there is still a
transition from high to low effort levels as the effort cost increases,
however, it is typically not as sharp as for the smoothed game (with
any value of k). An intriguing exception to this pattern is found in
the case of two-dimensional lattice graphs, for which the
evolutionary dynamics of the game with discontinuous payoff
function is essentially identical to that of the smoothed game (for
any value of the smoothing parameter). We tentatively conjecture
that the feature of lattice graphs which is responsible for this effect
is that they possess non-trivial clustering coefficients ([51–54]) —
in contrast to the other graphs we have considered, which have
zero clustering. The potential effect of the clustering coefficient on
the evolutionary dynamics of the MEC game defined on graphs
appears to be an interesting topic for future research.
Discussion
In this work we have proposed simple and natural continuous-
strategy versions of the classical discrete-strategy TD and MEC
games. We have modeled these games as continuous games with
smooth payoff functions, where the smoothing accounts for the
effects of errors in the perception and/or implementation of
individuals actions. The smoothed TD and MEC games can be
effectively analyzed using adaptive dynamics, which shows that the
predicted evolutionary dynamics of these games is in accord with
the behavior observed in empirical studies of the TD and MEC
games. In addition, we have studied the evolutionary dynamics of
the smoothed TD and MEC games using agent-based simulations.
These simulations have been performed both for populations of
randomly-interacting agents and for populations with more
complex interaction patterns, represented by graphs of varying
topologies. These simulation results are in agreement both with
the analytical adaptive dynamics results, and also with the
experimentally observed behavior.
For the smoothed TD game, we find both from the adaptive
dynamics analysis and from the agent-based simulations, that
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claims vary with the reward/punishment parameter R in a fashion
that is in excellent agreement with the empirically observed
behavior: low values of R result in high claims and high values of
R result in low claims. We recover the classical game theory result
that claims in the TD game with discontinuous payoff remain low
for all values of R by considering the limit in which the smoothing
parameter k??. Different interaction patterns among the
individuals playing the smoothed TD game, as represented by
studying the game on graphs of different topologies, appears to
have little effect on the evolutionary dynamics of the game.
We find similarly satisfactory results for the smoothed MEC
game. The analysis, both analytical and through simulations, again
yields results in good agreement with experiment: high effort levels
are found for low effort cost c and low effort levels occur for high
Figure 2. Results from simulating the TD game. (a)(c)(d)(e)(f) Average claims x in the smoothed TD game over the last 20% of 20000
generations versus the reward/punishment parameter R for different values of the smoothing parameter k, on a complete graph (a), a random
regular graph with degree 10 (c), a scale-free graph with mean degree 10 (d), 2D lattice graph with 4 neighbors (e), and 2D lattice graph with 8
neighbors (f). Parameter values: n~1024 for lattice networks and n~1000 for other networks, m~0:05, s~0:005, and b~5. (b) Number of individuals
versus their claims x, when R~0:15 and R~0:85, on a complete graph with parameter values: n~1000, m~0:05, s~0:005, k~2, and b~5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0093988.g002
The Traveler’s Dilemma and Minimum Effort Coordination Game
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 April 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 4 | e93988
effort cost. We again find that when the smoothed MEC game is
formulated on graphs of differing topology the topological type has
no significant effect on the evolutionary dynamics of the game.
The methods introduced in this paper are quite general and can
be applied to a wide variety of continuous-strategy games with
discontinuous payoff functions. Important examples of other
games that can be fruitfully studied using these methods include
the Bertrand Duopoly model [38] and the War of Attrition game
[6]. Here we will only briefly discuss the application of our
methods to these two games — detailed accounts will be given
elsewhere.
In the classical Bertrand Duopoly (BD) model [38] one
considers the interactions between two firms that produce a
homogeneous product. The strategy of each firm is the unit price
Figure 3. Results from simulating the MEC game. (a)(c)(d)(e)(f) Average effort levels x in the smoothed MEC game over the last 20% of 20000
generations versus the effort cost parameter c for different values of the smoothing parameter k, on a complete graph (a), a random regular graph
with degree 10 (c), a scale-free graph with mean degree 10 (d), 2D lattice graph with 4 neighbors (e), and 2D lattice graph with 8 neighbors (f).
Parameter values: n~1024 for lattice graphs and n~1000 for other graphs, m~0:05, s~0:005, and b~5. (b) Number of individuals versus their effort
levels x, when c~0:15 and c~0:85, on a complete graph with parameter values: n~1000, m~0:05, s~0:005, k~2, and b~5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0093988.g003
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that they set for their product. It is assumed that customers will
buy a quantity d(p) (where d(p) is the demand function) from the
firm with the lower price p, and will buy nothing from the firm
with the higher price. If both firms set the same price then it is
assumed that demand is split equally between them. It is also
assumed that both firms have the same marginal cost c. Thus, the
payoff obtained by one firm in its interaction with the other is a
discontinuous function of the difference between the prices set by
the two firms. This discontinuous payoff function can be smoothed
in exactly the manner described in this paper to yield a smoothed
game. In this case the smoothing function represents the
probability that customers buy the product from the firm with
the lower price as opposed to the firm with the higher price. In the
limit that this probability tends to one, the smoothed game
approaches the classical game.
The smoothed BD model can be analyzed using adaptive
dynamics just as we have done here for the TD and MEC games.
It may be shown for an arbitrary smoothing, that given a linear
demand function d(p) there exists a unique singular strategy p? (in
the domain of interest), that is strictly greater than the marginal
cost c. Furthermore, it may also be shown that the singular
strategy p? is always both convergent stable and an ESS. Thus, the
evolutionary dynamics of the smoothed BD game results in the
prices set by both firms converging to the level p?, which is strictly
greater than the marginal cost. At the evolutionary equilibrium p?
both firms obtain a positive payoff. Thus, the introduction of the
smoothed BD model effectively resolves the Bertrand Paradox that
occurs in the classical model. Moreover, our method extends to
the case of an arbitrary number of firms and sheds light on the
results obtained in [55].
The second example that will be mentioned here is the War of
Attrition (WoA) game [6]. The classical WoA game is concerned
with two individuals who are contesting a resource. In this game
each individual chooses a ’’display investment,’’ which is a
continuous variable representing the individual’s strategy. The
payoff in the classical game is a discontinuous function of the
difference in the display investments since it is assumed that the
individual with the higher investment obtains the resource, while
the lower investor does not, and both pay a cost that is a function
of the lower investment value.
This game can be smoothed and studied using adaptive
dynamics as we have done in this paper for the TD and MEC
games. It may be shown that the evolutionary dynamics depends
critically on the form of the cost function. For a linear cost
function, there exists a singular strategy that is always both
convergent stable and an ESS. However, for quadratic cost
functions, there exist singular strategies that are evolutionary
branching points. Thus, in the latter case, complex and surprising
evolutionary dynamics can occur.
In conclusion, therefore, we have introduced a new method of
formulating and analyzing the evolutionary dynamics of a wide
class of games, which include the continuous-strategy variants of
the TD and MEC games. We have studied the case of the
smoothed TD and MEC games in detail and shown that our
method provides a means of resolving the paradoxical behavior
associated with the original form of the games.
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